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Abstract 
Using a dataset for 31 Chinese provinces from 1998 to 2006, this paper provides a spatial Durbin 
panel analysis to test for fiscal interactions among China’s provinces in their public spending on 
infrastructure. We find significant positive interactions across Chinese provincial governments. 
Further analysis attempting to distinguish between the possible sources of such fiscal interactions 
reveals evidence of expenditure competition instead of yardstick competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Public infrastructure (transportation, telecommunication, water and sanitation, etc.) investment has 
been widely used as a tool for economic development, although empirical work fails to find 
uniquely supportive evidence of the positive association between the two. Studies finding 
supportive evidence can be dated back to Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), who argues that infrastructure 
provides highly valuable services to the private sector and thus improves its marginal productivity. 
Numerous studies have attempted to examine the contribution of public infrastructure to 
productivity in China (Démurger, 2001; Fan and Zhang, 2004; Vijverberg et al., 2011). For instance, 
Fan and Zhang (2004) point out that governmental investment in roads, electricity, education, and 
other public investment in rural areas has contributed to the rapid growth in China’s agricultural 
and rural non-agricultural production. Bom and Ligthart (2014) conduct a meta-analysis of 
numerous empirical studies (say, Pereira and Sagales (1999) in this journal) and find evidence that 
public spending on infrastructure contributes positively to economic growth.1 
While there have been numerous studies on infrastructure during the past few decades, most 
of them focus on the perspective of the impact of public infrastructure on economic outcomes 
(economic growth, job opportunities, etc.) at the national or regional level, and they provide no 
deep understanding of the processes directing the level of infrastructure (Ghosh and Meagher 
2004). In other words, what are the driving forces of public infrastructure investment? Studies 
from such a perspective are few. 
Public infrastructure spending can be influenced by a range of factors. These include budget 
constraints (Vuchelen and Caekelbergh, 2010), political-economic factors such as fiscal stringency 
and frequent changes of government (De Haan et al. 1996), and some general economic and fiscal 
variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), output gap, long-term interest rates, public debt 
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(Bruce et al., 2007; Mehrotra and Välilä, 2006; Painter and Bae, 2001), and fiscal (revenue) 
decentralization (Kappeler et al., 2013). We argue that infrastructure investment can also be 
affected by politically motivated incumbents, as it can be used by local governors (at a provincial 
or city level) to achieve two goals. On the one hand, local governments have incentives to attract 
private investment by providing more infrastructure services/spending. On the other hand, they 
also have incentives to provide more infrastructure investment if local governments believe that 
their turnover (promotion or reappointment by the central government) is linked to their relative 
performance (prosperous economic growth, better job opportunities created, or better public 
services provided in their jurisdictions). In order to achieve these two goals, local governments 
have long been believed to engage in interjurisdictional interaction, as recognized in the fiscal 
federalism literature. Specifically, the former goal rests on the framework of expenditure 
competition, while the latter falls into the framework of yardstick competition across local 
jurisdictions. In brief, although some studies examine the determinants of public infrastructure 
spending, studies of the strategic interaction behavior of local governments in infrastructure 
spending are rare. 
To our knowledge, the only paper (dealing with Chinese evidence) is Yu et al. (2011). 
However, their study only focuses on examining whether fiscal interactions in infrastructure 
spending exist across Chinese local governments using a cross-sectional dataset of 242 Chinese 
cities. Thus the possible sources of fiscal interactions with regard to local infrastructure spending 
remain untested. This study aims to fill that gap. Specifically, we examine the determinants of 
expenditure on public infrastructure in China using a panel dataset of 31 Chinese provinces during 
the 1998–2006 period. We propose a spatial Durbin panel model with spatial and time-period fixed 
effects to test whether China’s provinces are engaged in strategic interaction behavior in spending 
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on infrastructure. In addition, we proceed further to differentiate between different potential 
sources of fiscal interactions (expenditure competition, yardstick competition, etc.) across 
provincial governments. We mainly find that a provincial government tends to increase its own 
infrastructure spending in a response to a rise in the infrastructure spending of its neighboring 
provinces. Further analysis reveals that our results support for expenditure competition hypothesis 
instead of yardstick competition hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the spatial Durbin 
model with spatial fixed effects to test for possible sources of spatial interactions and provides the 
corresponding estimation techniques. Section 3 describes the data used in this analysis. Section 4 
reports the empirical results with spatial interaction effects tested. The last section concludes with 
policy implications. 
2. Spatial Model Formulation 
Over the last two decades, a body of literature has arisen in an effort to empirically examine 
whether the level of public expenditure of a jurisdiction might be influenced by that of its 
neighbors,2 and several different mechanisms were proposed by Manski (1993) through which one 
jurisdiction can be affected by the spending of its neighboring jurisdictions; namely, yardstick 
competition, expenditure competition, expenditure externalities, and ‘common intellectual trend’ 
that drives fiscal choices in the same direction.3 In what follows, the presence of yardstick 
competition, fiscal competition, expenditure externality are likely to induce spatial dependence in 
public infrastructure expenditure in China. In what follows, we will test these hypotheses 
empirically using a spatial Durbin fixed effects model. 
Spatial econometricians generally are of two minds on whether to apply the specific-to-
general or the general-to-specific approach (Elhorst, 2010; Mur and Angulo, 2009). In this study, 
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we use the general-to-specific approach; in other words, we specify an unconstrained spatial 
Durbin model that includes a spatially lagged dependent variable in addition to spatial lags of all 
independent variables. Specifically, the model is written in stacked form as: 
              Y = (ιT α) + ρ(ITWN)Y + Xβ + (ITWN)Xθ + ε, N = 1,…31; T = 1998, …2006       (1) 
where Y is a NT × 1 vector, X is a NT × K vector, β and θ are respectively a K × 1 vector of slope 
parameters to be estimated, ρ is a spatial autoregressive parameter that measures the magnitude of 
interdependence across provinces. ιT is a column vector of ones of dimension T, α is a N × 1 vector 
of provincial fixed effects,   is the Kronecker product and ε ~ N(0, σ2INT). Wn is the predetermined 
N × N spatial weights matrix in which the element is usually interpreted as the strength of spatial 
interaction between two units (provinces in this study). This is being posited as being the inverse 
function of the distance between two provinces i and j (i ≠ j).4 W is commonly row standardized 
such that the elements of each row sum to one. By convention, the diagonal elements of the weights 
matrix are set to be zero, since each province is not a neighbor of itself. Eq. (1) can be estimated 
using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques (see Elhorst and Fréret (2009) for the 
mathematical details).5 
LeSage and Pace (2009) provide two reasons why the spatial Durbin model can be the best 
point of departure for testing spatial interaction effects. If unobserved or unknown but relevant 
variables following a first-order spatial autoregressive process are omitted from the model, and if 
these variables are correlated with independent variables not omitted from the model, the spatial 
Durbin model will produce unbiased coefficient estimates in contrast to a spatial lag model. In 
addition, the spatial Durbin model will produce unbiased coefficient estimates even if the true data 
generation process is the spatial error model. 
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Several empirical tests are implemented in this study to select the preferable model. First, the 
likelihood ratio (LR) tests are used to examine whether the spatial Durbin model can be simplified 
into a spatial lag model, a spatial error model, or an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Failing 
to reject the null hypothesis H0: θ = 0 implies that the spatial Durbin model can be reduced to a 
spatial lag model, while failing to reject the hypothesis H0: θ = −ρβ leaves us with a spatial error 
model. In addition, if ρ = 0, an OLS model with a spatial lag on the regressors can be used. Second, 
the LR tests can also be used to examine the null hypothesis that the spatial or time-period fixed 
effects are jointly significant. Lastly, the Hausman’s specification test (Lee and Yu, 2010) is 
performed to test the fixed effects versus the random effects model. 
3. Data Source 
The dataset for this study consists of a panel of 31 provinces in mainland China (including four 
municipalities – Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing – and four autonomous regions –
Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Tibet) during 1998–2006. The dependent variable 
examined is the per capita infrastructure investment made by the provincial government (PROV), 
which is calculated as the difference between the total infrastructure investment made by all 
governments in that province (taken from the China Statistical Yearbook) and infrastructure 
investment made by city and lower-tier governments in the same province (taken from Statistical 
Materials of City and County Public Finances, Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao in 
Chinese). As the public finance dataset does not provide anymore the information on the city-level 
public infrastructure expenditure since 2007, our dataset covers until 2006. 
With respect to the explanatory variables, unless otherwise noted all variables are taken from 
the China Statistical Yearbook. In particular, REV indicates the own-source revenue from the 
provincial government, which measures the availability of resources that can be devoted to public 
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spending on infrastructure. We expect the coefficient on the revenue variable to be positive if the 
public good (i.e., infrastructure) is normal and Wagner’s law is satisfied. All expenditure and 
revenue data are converted into real value per capita using the provincial consumer price index 
and total provincial population as the divisors (2006 = 100). 
The next two sets of fiscal variables are public infrastructure spending by city governments 
(CITY) and by the central government (CENTRAL), respectively. The CITY variable is calculated 
as the sum of each city government’s real public expenditure (2006 = 100) in a particular province 
divided by the total population of all cities in that province. As mentioned earlier, accounting for 
these two vertical fiscal variables is necessary to identify the true horizontal spatial effects of 
public infrastructure spending across provinces. The omission of these two variables could result 
in biased estimates for the horizontal effects. 
Theoretically, the effect of the variable CITY on provincial public infrastructure spending is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, if two city governments within the same province increase their own 
spending on infrastructure (i.e., building a new road), the provincial government may also have 
incentives to increase its own infrastructure spending for the purpose of connecting these two roads, 
or connecting them with the main road within the province. On the other hand, if a city government 
invests in a project that the provincial government also wants to invest in, the provincial 
government may reduce its own efforts in response. Therefore the sign of this variable can be 
positive or negative. 
The variable CENTRAL is defined as the central government’s spending on infrastructure. The 
sign for this vertical fiscal variable can also be positive or negative. Infrastructure spending by the 
central government increases the marginal productivity of the province’s investment and thus the 
provincial government may have incentives to increase its own infrastructure spending. 
8 
Alternatively, the provincial government may tend to reduce its infrastructure spending if the 
central government finances the project in which the province would otherwise invest. 
EDU is defined as the percentage of total fiscal spending on education. Under the budgetary 
constraints of local governments, more public spending on education can imply that the provincial 
government should reduce spending on infrastructure. However, the provincial government might 
increase both infrastructure and education spending while cutting other types of expenditure if 
public spending on infrastructure and education are two priorities for the provincial government 
in making its budgetary decisions. Hence the sign of the EDU variable is indeterminate. 
URBAN measures the percentage of the population living in urban areas, which is expected to 
have two inverse effects. On the one hand, if economies of scale in infrastructure provision 
dominate, then ceteris paribus cities with a higher percentage of the population living in urban 
areas are expected to spend less on infrastructure per capita. On the other hand, higher urbanization 
rates may demand more infrastructure service provision if agglomeration economies increase the 
return to infrastructure expenditure in urban areas, or if there is an urban bias in service provisions 
(Randolph et al., 1996). Hence the influence of urbanization on infrastructure spending is 
ambiguous and this is left for empirical investigation. 
GAP is defined as the difference between the private fixed assets investments of a given 
province and the spatially weighted average of the private fixed assets investment of the rest 
provinces. The current performance evaluation system of Chinese local governments consists of 
several indexes, some of which are used to evaluate regional economy and social development, 
such as regional GDP growth, the growth rate of fixed asset investment, or the growth rate of 
foreign investment in real use. We argue that in an unevenly developed nation, benchmarking is 
one of the evaluation strategies that Chinese central government will be used to determine the 
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extent to which one specific local government is better than others or “wise enough to try and learn 
how to match and even surpass them at it” (IBC 1996). In this study, we use local government’s 
private fixed assets investments to reflect the central government’s benchmarking strategy to 
evaluate the local government’s performance. We hypothesize that if the private investment in 
fixed assets in a particular province is high compared to the national average, or the private 
investment is relatively high in that province, the given province ‘outperforms’ others from the 
eyes of their upper government (i.e., the central government). Hence, if the region already has a 
higher level of private investment, the regional government will be not be motivated to spend more 
on infrastructure. In empirical implementation, the sign for GAP therefore is expected to be 
negative. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these data. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of 31 Chinese provinces during 1998–2006 
 Unit Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable       
  PROV 
RMB Yuan 
(2006 = 100) 
279 159.02 318.44 8.85 2,521.97 
Independent Variable       
  CENTRAL 
RMB Yuan 
(2006 = 100) 
279 727.78 708.79 90.44 3,810.48 
  CITY 
RMB Yuan 
(2006 = 100) 
279 147.12 301.65 6.77 2,307.52 
  REV 
RMB Yuan 
(2006 = 100) 
279 951.47 1,190.45 155.55 8,683.60 
  EDU % 279 15.15 2.41 8.56 21.14 
  URBAN % 279 25.40 8.46 15.00 46.00 
  GAP 
1 billion RMB 
Yuan (2006 = 
100) 
279 181.50 177.01 4.44 1,111.14 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the empirical regression results using a panel of 31 provinces over the 
period 1998–2006. The analysis of the spatial panel model in this empirical study is performed 
using Paul Elhorst’s MATLAB routines from his website (http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst). This 
section first identifies and examines the major determinants of provincial public infrastructure 
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spending, while focusing on the spatial interaction effects. Then, this section proceeds further to 
test for the yardstick competition and expenditure competition hypotheses, respectively. 
Spatial Regression Results 
Table 2 reports the results of the spatial Durbin model with spatial fixed effects. Column 1 presents 
the results using the basic weighting matrix specification−the distance-based weighting scheme. 
To investigate whether the spatial Durbin model can be reduced to the spatial lag or error model, 
we performed an LR test. The LR test results (p < 0.01 for the null hypothesis θ = 0, and for the 
null hypothesis θ = −ρβ) indicate that the spatial Durbin model may be properly applied to describe 
the public infrastructure expenditure relationship among provinces in China. Furthermore, we test 
the random effects model against the fixed effects model using Hausman’s specification test. The 
results (χ2 = 22.18, df = 12, p < 0.05) nullify the usage of the random effects model and favor the 
fixed effects specification. Lastly, we control for both spatial fixed effects and time-period fixed. 
In summary, these test results justify the adoption of the spatial Durbin model with spatial fixed 
effects. The coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable in the spatial Durbin model is 
0.443 and is statistically significant at 1%. The result shows that a provincial government tends to 
increase its own spending in response to the rise in the public infrastructure spending of its 
neighbors, showing evidence that Chinese provincial governments are engaging in strategic 
interactions in infrastructure spending. 
With respect to the other explanatory variables, it should be noted that in the spatial model, 
the interpretation of the parameter is different from conventional least square interpretation 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009). In the traditional OLS model the coefficients represent marginal effects, 
while in the spatial models (SAR or SDM model) one could distinguish between (average) direct 
effects, indirect effects, and total effects that take into account also the feedback effects arising 
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from the spatial dependence. For the case of the SAR model, the sign of each X variable can be 
proved to the same as the calculated direct effect, the indirect effect, or the total effect (LeSage 
and Pace, 2009), while the sign of each X variable in the SDM model can be different from the 
direct effect, the indirect effect, or the total effect. In other words, the coefficient on each individual 
X variable is not directly interpretable with regard to how explanatory variables in the model affect 
the dependent variable. The detailed derivations of the direct effects, indirect (spatial spillover) 
effects, and total effects of each X variable on the dependent variable can be found at LeSage and 
Pace (2009) in a cross-sectional setting and Elhorst (2014) in a spatial panel data setting. The 
inferential statistics (say, t-values for the direct/indirect/total effect) can be obtained via the Delta 
method. 
Table 2 shows that the direct effect of revenue is significant and positive with a coefficient 
equal to 0.060, which implies that the provincial government’s own-source of a specific province 
has a positive impact on its public infrastructure spending. The indirect effect of revenue is 
negative but insignificant with a coefficient equal to 0.033. This means that neighboring 
provinces’ revenue has no effect on the infrastructure expenditure of the particular province, 
implying there are no spatial spillovers of government’s own-source revenue. Overall, the positive 
direct impact of revenue is partially offset by the negative indirect impact, which generates a 
positive total effect that is significantly different from zero. Turing to other covariates, we find that, 
in general, the direct effect dominates the indirect effects which enables the total effect to have the 
same sign and statistical significance like the direct effect estimates. Focusing on the total effects 
estimates, the central government’s provision of infrastructure is found to complement the 
provincial government’s provision. Likely, the city government’s provision of infrastructure is a 
complement as the positive spillovers effect dominates the negative direct effects of city 
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government’s infrastructure spending. Education expenditure competes with infrastructure 
expenditure under constant budgetary constraints. A higher degree of urbanization has neither 
positive nor negative effect on infrastructure spending. One possible explanation could be due to 
the interplay of the negative spillover effect of urbanization and the dual effects of urbanization as 
mentioned in the data source section. Finally, the total effect of the GAP variable on public 
infrastructure is statistically insignificant, which seems to be inconsistent with our early conjecture 
that if the region already has a higher level of private investment, the regional government will be 
not be motivated to spend more on infrastructure. From Table 2, we can see that the negative direct 
impact of the GAP variable is offset to a large extent by the positive indirect (spillovers) impact, 
which generates a total effect that is statistically insignificant. This does not mean that the private 
investment variable has no effect on public infrastructure spending in China. Indeed, such variable 
does have effects on public infrastructure spending in China but its effects are opposite and cancel 
each other out. 
Table 2. Results of the spatial Durbin fixed effects model (dependent variable: real per capita 
provincial infrastructure expenditure, 2006 = 100) 
 Spatial Durbin Panel Model with Distance-based W 
Main    
CENTRAL 0.320***(16.70)   
CITY 0.277**(2.17)   
REV 0.052**(2.37)   
EDU 36.654***(5.28)   
URBAN 5.218(1.39)   
GAP 0.212*(2.21)   
Wx    
W*CENTRAL 0.209***(2.57)   
W*CITY 1.776***(3.84)   
W*REV 0.290***(3.06)   
W*EDU 27.413(0.76)   
W*URBAN 2.384(0.11)   
W*GAP 0.220(0.30)   
Spatial    
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 0.443***(3.99)   
Partial effects Direct Indirect Total 
CENTRAL 0.357***(18.42) 0.169**(2.31) 0.526**(2.62) 
CITY 0.100*(2.01) 3.803**(2.25) 2.803**(2.40) 
REV 0.060**(2.48) 0.033(1.20) 0.027*(1.95) 
EDU 40.534***(5.24) 50.224*(1.84) 90.758**(2.76) 
URBAN 6.291(1.33) 2.952*(1.91) 3.339(1.37) 
GAP 0.445*(2.44) 0.217*(2.00) 0.228(0.69) 
Log-likelihood 1,488.875   
N 279   
Number of cross-sections 31   
Number of time periods 9   
Spatial fixed effects Yes   
Time-period fixed effects Yes   
LR test of  = 0 [0.0000]   
LR test of  =  [0.0000]   
Hausman test of fixed vs. 
random effects 
[0.0355]   
Notes: (i) ***,**, and *, respectively, denote significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level; (ii) Absolute t 
statistics are reported in parentheses; (iii) p values are reported in brackets. 
 
The obvious question in previous analysis is that of endogeneity of the regressors due to WY 
(i.e., the spatially lagged dependent variable) and other explanatory variables like government 
revenues and expenditures on education, if infrastructure spending in one province depends on the 
amount of infrastructure spending in other provinces, then spending in other provinces depends on 
spending in the province of interest. Similarly, the explanatory variables like government revenues 
and expenditures on education, together with the dependent variable can be simultaneous outcomes 
of the overall provincial budgeting process. If so, instruments are required. However, our attempt 
to deal with the possible endogeneity problem using instruments suggested by Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998) and Arraiz et al. (2010) seems not to be successful as the instruments fail to pass either the 
under-identification test (Anderson canonical correlation LR test) or over-identification test 
(Sargan test. The instrumental variable regression results are not reported. 
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Test for the Yardstick Competition Hypotheses 
The above empirical evidence supports the spatial Durbin fixed effects model. Mainly, we find 
that the spatial autoregressive parameter is positive, indicating that a provincial government seems 
to increase its own infrastructure spending in response to a rise in the infrastructure spending of 
its neighboring provinces. So far it is not clear whether such positive spatial interdependence stems 
from yardstick competition, from expenditure competition, or from both. In what follows, we first 
propose two alternative ways to test for possible yardstick competition, then test for expenditure 
competition in the next section. 
We hypothesize that the effect of yardstick competition is more manifest right before election 
or appointment, which happens when the National People’s Congress (NPC) is held. This implies 
that we may observe two phenomena if the yardstick competition exists. First, before attending the 
NPC local officials are more prone to providing better public services (by spending more on public 
goods such as infrastructure) in order to ‘show off’ their economic performance or 
accomplishments. Second, the competition among provinces would become more intensive before 
NPC. Our sample covers the period 1996–2008, during which the NPC was held twice (in 1998 
and 2003). We propose two ways to test the yardstick competition hypothesis. The first testing 
procedure rests on the idea that, if the yardstick competition theory holds, the parameters for the 
two-year dummy variables year1997 and year2002 should be expected to be positive, statistically 
significant, and bigger than their ‘neighboring’ dummy variables by using the spatial Durbin model 
(Eq. 1 or Table 2). It turned out that the two dummy variables (year1997, year2002) are positive 
but statistically insignificant (results not shown). In a further step, we ran a simple t-test 
respectively on year1997 and year2002 and their ‘neighboring’ time dummy variables under the 
null hypothesis H0: year1997 = year1996 or year1997 = year1998, and H0: year2002 = year2003 
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or year2002 = year2001. The null hypotheses are not rejected for any case. Thus we conclude that 
yardstick competition hypothesis is not supported via this empirical implementation. The second 
testing procedure is to test whether the spatial autoregressive parameters of the interaction terms 
(WY*1997, WY*2002) are significantly different from (and also bigger than) those of the interacted 
term of WY with other year dummies. If so, they may imply that the provincial competition is more 
fierce before the election year and we may conclude that the yardstick competition hypothesis is 
verified. The coefficient estimates of these spatial autoregressive parameters (i.e., the ρ terms) are 
plotted in Figure 1 based on estimating a SAR model where the parameters are estimated based on 
cross-sectional data for each year. Clearly we can see that there is no evidence showing that these 
two values (0.51 and −0.25) are larger than their neighboring values. This result implies that the 
yardstick competition hypothesis cannot be verified empirically in such a model specification. In 
sum, neither of the proposed procedures finds empirical evidence in favor of yardstick competition. 
 
Figure 1. Spatial autoregressive parameters (yearly spatial regression) 
Note: absolute t values are reported in parenthesis 
 
Test for the Expenditure Competition Hypothesis 
Next, we test whether the positive spatial interdependence stems from expenditure competition. 
The literature on the expenditure competition hypothesis suggests that local governors are 
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expected to compete with their neighbors in order to attract households or firms. Our strategy to 
empirically examine the existence of this type of competition is to test whether local governors 
have strong incentives to improve their infrastructure in order to attract more capital in the form 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). In other words, we consider whether governmental 
infrastructure expenditure is an important determinant in the location choice of FDI. 
Causes of regional FDI distribution have been extensively explored in the literature 
(Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002; Buckley et al., 2007; Chou et al., 2011; He, 2002; Poelhekke and 
Van der Ploeg, 2009). However, most existing studies, except for Chou et al. (2011), fail to take 
into account the spatial dependence effect of regional FDI (or outward FDI). In other words, these 
studies do not consider that the FDI locational decision behavior of a region can be affected by its 
‘neighboring’ regions. 
Built on several studies by Coughlin and Segev (2000), Garretsen and Peeters (2009), and 
Chou et al. (2011), and also considering the dynamic nature of FDI distribution, we specify the 
following spatial dynamic panel model (Lee and Yu, 2014) on regional FDI in China to empirically 
test the expenditure hypothesis: 
FDIit = α + θLFDIi,t-1 + ρ∑j=kWijFDIjt + ψ∑j=kWijFDIjt-1 +  γINFRAit + ∑kZit(k)βk + μi + εit, 
                                  i = 1,…,27; t = 1998,…, 2006           (2) 
where FDIit (LFDIi,t-1) indicates the FDI of province i at time t (t  1). ∑j=kWijFDIjt-1 is neighboring 
provinces’ FDI at the t  1 period. Detailed definitions of the dependent variable and independent 
variables, data sources, and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. INFRAit denotes the 
infrastructure investment made by the provincial government, and Zs are vectors of control 
variables which are identified as determinants to affect regional FDI distribution. They include 
GDP, which measures the market demand and size effect, MARKET which is defined as W·GDP 
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and is a proxy variable for market potential. WAGE which is the provincial average wage of staff 
and workers and measures production/labor cost, HUMANit which is defined as the number of 
students enrolled in higher education in province i at time t, which is used to capture the average 
level of provincial human capital. The model also includes provincial dummies to control for 
provincial variation from changes in economic environment common across time. All variables 
(except Human) variable are taken in logarithmic form. 
Table 3 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (FDI model, 1998–2006) 
Variable Description Source Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable      
FDI Per capita real foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is defined as FDI (US $) that is 
first converted to Chinese RMB using yearly 
averaged dollar/RMB exchange rate, 
converted again to 1995 constant RMB using 
the provincial CPI deflator, and divided by 
population (RMB Yuan/person, 1995 = 100) 
NBS (2010) 1,396.87 1,926.28 3.52 9,651.95 
Independent variable (provincial/time dummies omitted)      
GDP Per capita real provincial GDP (RMB 
Yuan/person, 1995 = 100) 
NBS (2010) 10,299.37 7,500.39 2,191.27 41,075.82 
WAGE Real provincial average wage of staff and 
workers (RMB Yuan, 1995 = 100) 
NBS (2010) 11,083.79 4,561.13 5,027.59 31,611.59 
HUMAN Number of students enrolled in higher 
education per 10,000 persons (%) 
NBS (2010) 0.99 1.05 0.11 6.90 
MARKET Defined as W·GDP, where the W is the 
distanced-based spatial weighting matrix, and 
is a proxy variable for market potential. 
Longitude and latitude data for each province 
are taken from Google Earth (Yuan/person, 
1995 = 100) 
NBS (2010) 323.10 143.64 69.83 780.10 
INFRA Per capita infrastructure investment made by 
the provincial government, which is 
calculated as the difference between the total 
infrastructure investment made by all 
governments in that province (taken from the 
China Statistical Yearbook) and 
infrastructure investment made by city and 
lower-tier governments in the same province 
(Statistical Materials of City and County 
Public Finances, Quanguo dishixian 
caizheng tongji ziliao in Chinese) (RMB 
Yuan/person, 1995 = 100) 
NBS 
(various 
years) 
171.00 224.90 15.53 1,567.46 
Note: All variables described here are expressed in logarithmic form in the regression model. 
 
In terms of model estimation, it is recognized that econometric analysis of dynamic panel 
models is now fairly standard (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and spatial econometric literature is well 
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documented (LeSage and Pace, 2009); econometric analysis combining both spatial and dynamic 
panel models remains at an early stage of development. Following Kukenova and Monteiro (2009), 
we extend the system-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) to account for spatial effects.6 
Table 4 reports the results of the spatial dynamic panel model of FDI.7 
Recalling that our main goal is to test the expenditure hypothesis, under which we should 
expect the coefficient of the variable INFRA to be positive, we find that public spending on 
infrastructure is statistically significant at the 5% level, and it is positively associated with 
provincial FDI. This result confirms the general expectation that better infrastructure reduces 
production and trade cost and FDI tends toward regions with better infrastructure facilities. Clearly 
this result lends some support for the expenditure competition hypothesis.8 
In terms of other independent variables, the coefficient on the time-lagged FDI (LFDI) is 0.779 
and is statistically significant at 1% level. This result justifies the usage of the dynamic model and, 
more importantly, it is consistent with Kinoshita and Campos (2004) that past FDI can exert a 
positive feedback effect on current FDI; that is, FDI is found to be persistent over time. The 
spatially lagged FDI (W·FDI) is found to be 0.032 and statistically significant, confirming the 
presence of spatial interdependence of FDI across Chinese provinces. Specifically, increased FDI 
in neighboring provinces has positive effects on FDI of one province. However, the previous FDI 
in neighboring provinces does not affect the current FDI of that province. There is some evidence 
that larger economies (GDP) attracts more investment, which is consistent with the finding of 
numerous studies of FDI location that foreign investors are attracted to a large domestic market. 
Market potential (MARKET) is negative and bears an insignificant sign. In other words, the 
multinational companies’ decision to enter a particular region in China is not affected by that the 
market size/demand of its ‘neighboring’ regions. This result may imply that multinational 
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companies may serve China’s whole market irrespective of the region they are located in, or that 
transportation costs are not important within China. The coefficient on labor cost (WAGE) is 
significant and positive. This result confirms the common belief that labor cost should be one main 
determinant of FDI, as one goal of multinational companies is to invest in developing countries 
(like China) which have lower labor costs and huge growth potential. This result hence is consistent 
with Coughlin and Segev (2000), but contrary to studies by Defever (2006), Guimaraes et al. 
(2000), and Lucas (1993). Finally, as expected, the labor quality variable (HUMAN) is positive 
and an important determinant of FDI, which is a result consistent with Coughlin and Segev (2000) 
and Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001). This result implies that regional capacity to attract foreign 
firms relies on high labor quality (productivity) instead of low costs of labor. 
In summary, it seems clear that the positive spatial interdependence in the main regression 
model in Section 4.1 stems from expenditure competition instead of yardstick competition, as the 
former hypothesis is supported by the empirical test we just implemented in this section. 
Table 4. A simple test for the expenditure competition hypothesis: Spatial dynamic panel model of 
FDI (dependent variable: FDI) 
 Spatial system GMM model 
θ (FDI(t1)) 0.779*** 
 (24.62) 
ρ (W*FDI) 0.032*** 
 (3.74) 
ψ (W*FDI(t1)) 0.010 
 (1.49) 
INFRA 0.142** 
 (2.18) 
GDP 0.481* 
 (1.92) 
WAGE 0.614*** 
 (3.86) 
HUMAN 1.671* 
 (1.68) 
MARKET −1.703 
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 (0.58) 
Constant 0.848 
 (0.11) 
Province dummy Y 
Observations 216 
No. of provinces 27 
(Buse 1973) R2 adj. 0.45 
Spatial Panel Autocorrelation Tests 
LM Error (Burridge) test [0.6089] 
LM Error (Robust) test [0.6160] 
LM Lag (Anselin) test [0.0488] 
LM Lag (Robust) test [0.0894] 
Notes: 1) Absolute robust t statistics are reported in parentheses; 2) p values are reported in square brackets; 3) *, **, 
***, respectively, indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level; 4) The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) diagnostics 
test statistics in a panel data setting can be found in Anselin et al. (2006), while the detailed derivations of these tests 
for a spatial panel data model with spatial fixed effects can be found in Debarsy and Ertur (2010). Under the null 
hypothesis, these tests follow a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The expenditure behaviors of local governments (municipalities, regions, or provinces) were 
traditionally explored through three channels: yardstick competition, fiscal competition (tax 
competition or expenditure competition), and expenditure externality (Manski, 1993). Using a 
panel of 31 Chinese provinces during 1998–2006 we identified the determinants of expenditure on 
public infrastructure in China. In particular, we examined whether China’s provincial governments 
are engaged in strategic interaction behavior in infrastructure. Specifying a spatial Durbin model 
with fixed effects, which was identified to be the preferable model using the LR tests and 
Hausman’s specification test, we found that the spatial autoregressive parameter is positive, 
indicating that a provincial government tends to increase its own infrastructure spending in 
response to a rise in the infrastructure spending of its neighboring provinces. 
This empirical finding has three implications. First, it rules out the expenditure externality 
(spillover) hypothesis, which implies that the spatial autoregressive parameter is negative in its 
empirical implementation. In this study, as we used provinces instead of smaller administrative 
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regions (counties or cities) as our analytical units, it is less likely that the benefits of the public 
infrastructure expenditure of one province would spread to its neighboring provinces. Hence such 
an empirical finding is not unexpected. Second, the positive spatial autoregressive parameter 
indicates the possible validity of both yardstick competition hypothesis and expenditure 
competition hypothesis. Further analysis is implemented to distinguish between these two possible 
hypotheses by estimating two additional empirical models. The regression results eventually lead 
us to a conclusion that provincial competition on infrastructure spending takes the form of 
expenditure competition rather than yardstick competition. This result implies that, in order to 
promote local economic growth, local governors have incentives to engage in expenditure 
competition with their (geographic or economic) neighbors to attract mobile sources, agreeing with 
Chen et al. (2005), Tao et al. (2009), and Xu (2011), together with others who argue that local 
governments are engaged in fiscal competition for economic development and growth and will 
take investing in infrastructure as the prior tool to reach their goals, which may result in a ‘race to 
the top’ of government expenditures. Last, an interesting phenomenon can be revealed if this study 
is contrasted to a closely related empirical study by Yu et al. (2011) that uses cities (smaller 
administrative regions than provinces) as the analytical units. Using China’s city-level cross-
sectional data in 2005 to examine the city governments’ infrastructure expenditure behavior, they 
find that a city government tends to reduce its own infrastructure spending as a response to the rise 
in infrastructure expenditure of its neighboring cities, which is reasonable as it is more likely that 
the benefits of the public infrastructure expenditure of one city would spread to its neighboring 
cities. In contrast, this study uses provinces as the analytical units; intuitively, it should be expected 
that provincial governments’ infrastructure spending will be less likely to have spillovers to its 
neighboring provinces. The empirical analysis of this study confirmed such intuition. In brief, the 
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implication is that, on the particular public spending category infrastructure, the lower-tier 
governments will tend to free ride, while the upper-tier governments tend to engage in expenditure 
competition (for mobile resources). 
The findings from this study also show that, with greater financial capacity and efforts by the 
central government to invest in local infrastructure, local governments can play a more active role 
in financing local infrastructure, thereby acting as better agents of social-economic and physical 
transformation. Furthermore, education spending is found to crowd out infrastructure spending. 
Public expenditures on infrastructure and education are considered to be the two most important 
spending categories by local governments as their contributions to local economic growth and 
development have long been recognized. Under budgetary constraints, if China’s local 
governments are unwilling to sacrifice either spending category, they may choose to cut back other 
less important spending, such as expenditure on government administration, which has been 
observed to be much higher than some developed nations such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Korea, and Japan.9 
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Notes 
1. Other related studies published in this journal yet not cited in the meta-analysis include: Albala-
Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2004), Pereira and Andraz (2005), Rioja (2003). 
2. See Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) for overviews of the empirical research on strategic 
interactions among local governments. 
3. See Manski (1993) and Yu et al. (2013) for details on explaining these sources. 
4. Other commonly used weights matrix specifications include: the contiguity-based binary matrix, 
the spatial weight matrix constructed based on the kth nearest neigbours, and the social-economic 
spatial weights matrix. 
5. If the distribution of idiosyncratic error is misspecified, the estimator can be viewed as Quasi-
MLE. In this case, the information matrix inequality does not hold anymore. To make statistical 
inference, we can estimate the information matrix and expected Hessian matrix, respectively, to 
obtain a consistent estimate for asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. This shall be the 
direction that future research might usefully take. We would like to thank one of the reviewers 
for raising this issue. 
6. The spatial system-GMM estimator is known as having the advantage over traditional spatial 
MLE in that the SYS-GMM estimators can also be used to instrument endogenous explanatory 
variables (other than Yt-1 and WYt). More importantly, both studies find that the SYS-GMM 
estimator substantially reduces the bias for the spatially lagged parameter (an issue appeared 
from estimating spatial difference-GMM estimator. An alternative line of research could be to 
account for spatial effects in the DDLS (double-difference least squares) estimator (for linear 
dynamic panel model) that is developed by Han-Phillips (2010) under the premise that the 
dynamic panel autoregressive coefficient approaches a unity and contains a deterministic time 
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trend (i.e., there is a unit root). We did not follow such an approach here. 
7. Details on the spatial dynamic panel (system GMM) model can be found at Kukenova and 
Monteiro (2009), Lee and Yu (2014), and Zheng et al. (2014). Thanks to one anonymous reviewer, 
it is worth mentioning that the system GMM that uses internal instruments “within the data” (due 
to difficulties on finding the external instruments) could suffer from the potential weak 
instrument problem in the level model when the series are persistent, or when the dynamic panel 
autoregressive coefficient (ρ) approaches unity, which causes the IV estimator to perform poorly 
(inconsistency, inaccurate inference, etc.). 
8. Elhorst (2012) summarized the mathematical formulas of the direct and indirect effects estimates 
of several types of spatial dynamic panel models. However, to the best of our knowledge, the 
partial effects have not been derived so far for the spatial system GMM model. So this part of 
empirical analysis, we have to use point estimates of the spatial system GMM model for 
interpretation, recognizing that, though, this may lead to misleading conclusions. 
9. China Youth Daily, accessed on August 6, 2014 from http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2006-
03/06/content_1328768.htm. 
